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ARTICLES
The Limitation of Copyright and Patents by the
Rules for the Free Movement of Goods in the
European Common Market
by Valentine Korah*t
I. THE EEC CONSTrrUTION
n 1957, six European States - France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands - established the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC).1 The EEC signed and ratified the Treaty of
Rome ('the Treaty') which was based on the foundations of the Commu-
nity: the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.2 These
rules have been generously interpreted by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Communities ('the Court' or 'the Community Court') since they
give effect to the basic principles of the Common Market. There are, of
course many other provisions in the Treaty: rules of competition,3 taxa-
tion, and the approximation of laws,4 procedures for giving effect to eco-
nomic and social policy,5 and procedures for the creation of institutions.6
If conceived of as a federation, however, the powers of EEC are slight.
The legislature is the Council of Ministers, composed of ministers of
member States which are usually jealous of their sovereignty and national
interests. Since 1966, when the French refused to attend its meetings for
six months, no legislation has been passed which conflicted with the im-
* Reader in English Law at University College London, Barrister.
t Mrs. Korah extends her gratitude to Professor Cornish of the London School of Eco-
nomics; Peter Cottis, Peter Freeman, Chris Kerse, Hans Sachse, and George Wright of the
Commission of the European Communities for their constructive criticisms.
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957, 295
U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2Id. at arts. 9-84.
3 Id. at arts. 85-94.
4 Id. at arts. 95-102.
5 Id. at arts. 103-28.
6 Id. at arts. 129-30 and 137-98.
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portant interests of any member State.7 Legislation is passed, much in
the same manner as international treaties are made, through package
deals worked out by national politicians and by both national and Com-
munity officials in tough, confidential sessions." With the accession of the
United Kingdom, Denmark and Eire at the end of 1972,1 and Greece at
the end of 1980,10 the problems of achieving major changes have been
more complex. Recently, the European Parliament has been elected di-
rectly,' 1 and no longer consists of members of national parliaments, but it
still has far less legislative power than Congress.12 The Parliament has
limited control over the budget, is required to consider some secondary
legislation, and has recently established the power to block certain provi-
sions by prolonging its consideration of them.23 It can also dismiss the
Members of the Commission - a drastic power, never yet used. 4 The
Members of the Commission are politicians acceptable to member States
but owing their allegiance to the Communities. Its secretariat consists of
Community officials, and the Commission has some power to make secon-
dary legislation of minor kinds, especially in the fields of agriculture and
competition. 5 It also proposes legislative measures to the Council.' This,
however, is often a frustrating experience, as each Member of the Council
is usually more concerned with the welfare of his own member State than
that of the Community.
Article 2 of the EEC Treaty sets out the Community's basic
objectives:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
the States belonging to it.
I H. SMITH & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY; A COM-
MENTARY 10 (1980).
' See generally, Thompson, The Common Market: A New Order, 41 WASH. L. REV. 385
(1966).
1 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, done Jan. 22,
1972, reprinted in Treaty Establishing the European Community 981 (1978).
1 Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, done May 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 291) 9 (1979).
" Act Concerning the Election of Representatives to the Assembly by Direct Universal
Sufferage, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 5 (1976).
12 See generally, Thompson, supra note 8, at 393-95.
Is See Jacobs, Isoglucose Resurgent: Two Powers of the European Parliament Upheld
by the Court, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 219 (1981).
14 Thompson, supra note 8, at 387.
15 See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 39, 87.
16 Thompson, supra note 8, at 387.
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Other goals, such as the protection of the environment, are to be found in
the preamble. The Community Court often interprets the more concrete
provisions of the Treaty in light of these vague desiderata, thereby
achieving greater freedom to further the integration of the market.
Article 3 outlines the activities of the Community to carry out the
purposes stated in Article 2, including:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all
measures having equivalent effect;...
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of
movement for persons, services and capital; ... [and]
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted...
II. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
Over the transitional periods, customs duties were abolished among
member states and a common external tariff was established for goods
initially entering the Common Market.17 An important form of protection
in the 1950's was quotas. Two hypothetical examples of such quotas
might be: 1) only 1,000 tons of widgets shall be imported to France from
Germany, and 2) no widgets shall be so imported. These quantitative re-
strictions were also liberalized and finally abolished during the transi-
tional periods, which have since expired apart from that for Greece.18
Article 30 provides that "quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the follow-
ing provisions, be prohibited between Member States." Export quotas are
prohibited by Article 34. Since they implement one of the foundations of
the Treaty, these provisions have been widely interpreted. The Cassis de
Dijon case,19 for instance, has confirmed that rules which do not openly
17 See, e.g., Convention on the Transitional Provisions, signed April 8, 1951, reprinted
in B ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (K. Simmonds, ed.) B 9021 (1974).
18 Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, supra note 10, at part 4, see, e.g. arts.
25 & 29.
", Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [hereinafter cited
as Cassis de Dijon] (120/78) [1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 494; see also
Directive 70/50 Special Edition O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 13) 29 (1970). Some of the recent
cases in this field are discussed by Derrick Wyatt in Qualitative Restriction and Measures
Having Equivalent Effect, 6 EUROPEAN L. REv. 185 (1980), and Alan Dashwood, Cassis dd
Dijon - A Major Step in the Liberalisation of Trade, 9 EURoPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV.
268 (1981). The best text book discussion of measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions
is probably in WYATr & DASHWOOD, THE SUBsTANTIvE LAW OF THE E.E.C., ch. 10 (1980).
Some justifications other than those cited in Article 36 for such restrictions were read by the
Court into Article 30, for instance infringement of the rules of fair competition. With this
important development, this article is not much concerned.
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discriminate against imports, but bear more heavily on them than on lo-
cal products, are prohibited by Article 30.0 It was clearly envisaged that
intellectual property rights might operate as measures of equivalent effect
to quantitiative restrictions since Article 36 provides that:
The provisions of Articles 30-34 shall not preclude prohibitions or re-
strictions on imports . .. justified on grounds of... the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between member states.
Had the use of a patent, for instance, not been envisaged as a measure of
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, there would have been no
need to include industrial and commercial property in this proviso. More-
over, the exception is limited. The restriction on imports must be justi-
fied on one of the grounds set out, and there is a limiting proviso in the
second sentence.
III. ARTICLE 85
In the early 1960's, when the first transitional period came to an end
and customs and quotas between member States were phased out, prices
varied considerably. The laws and traditions in each country were differ-
ent. Distribution systems varied, and local manufacturers of many prod-
ucts had enjoyed protection for a generation. Currencies were then
pegged under the Bretton Woods Agreement, but from time to time there
were substantial changes as one currency or another was devalued. It
often paid a manufacturer to charge different prices in different parts of
the Common Market, irrespective of cost differences, provided he could
prevent goods from the lower priced areas from seeping back into those
areas where higher prices could be charged. In the early days, few people
realized the importance of the principle of the free movement of goods in
relation to intellectual property rights,21 although the advice was fre-
quently given that any contractual ban on exports or imports was con-
trary to Article 85. This Article prohibits, as incompatible with the Com-
mon Market, collusion between firms that may affect trade between
member States, and has as its object or effect the restriction, distortion or
prevention of competition within the Common Market.
If contractual restrictions on the free movement of goods are prohib-
ited and void under the competition rules, can not some segregation of
markets be achieved by arranging that a particular mark, or the patent
for a particular invention, should be held by different persons in different
20 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 652, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 510-11.
2 See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
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countries? The laws protecting such rights are still national and largely
limited to acts within the country. The holder in the State that happens
to support a high price for the protected product could then use his intel-
lectual property right to restrain the sale of such products marketed with
the consent of the person who holds the right in a State where prices are
lower.
A. The Grundig Case
22
As early as 1957, Grundig established a network of exclusive dealers
in member States other than Germany.23 The company assumed responsi-
bility for supplying the German wholesalers, but in other member States
it agreed to supply through a single exclusive distributor who would ad-
vertise its apparatus, arrange a retail network, provide repair service both
for machines under guarantee and older ones, along with generally pro-
moting the mark.24 Had this been the only provision, the agreement
would probably have been exempted from the competition rules under
Article 85(3). Grundig went further, however, in protecting its exclusive
dealers. All of its dealers, both exclusive distributors and the German
wholesalers, agreed not to export the goods, and the exclusive dealer in
each country was able to register in his own name the national trade
mark 'Gint' (Grunding International), which at that time was placed on
all Grundig machines in addition to the widely known 'Grundig' mark.2 5
When two large retailers, UNEF and Leissner, bought large quantities of
Grundig apparatus far more cheaply from German wholesalers than was
possible through the network set up by Consten, Grundig's distributor in
France, Consten was able to bring an action claiming that this amounted
to the tort of unfair competition28 and a trademark infringement.
Eventually, the agreement was found by the Commission to infringe
on Article 85(1) and to be incapable of exemption because of the absolute
territorial protection that would be conferred upon Consten were the
agreement upheld.27 A difference in list prices between France and Ger-
many of some 40 percent and, even after allowing for discounts, of over 20
22 Re Grundig's Agreement, [1964] Common Mkt. L.R. 489, on appeal to the Commu-
nity Court sub noma., Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, (56 & 58/64) [1966] E.C.R. 299,
[1966] Common Mkt. L.R. 418 [hereinafter cited as Consten].
21 Consten [1966] E.C.R. 303, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. at 423.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 303, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. at 420.
21 Id. at 304, [19661 Common Mkt. L.R. at 420-21. The tort of unfair competition in-
volves the undermining of an exclusive dealing agreement made between other parties by
buying goods for resale within the territory from dealers who were prohibited from selling
outside their territory.
2I Id. at 304, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. at 435.
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percent had been maintained.28 It might have been higher were Consten
able to prevent the parallel imports which in the very first year had at-
tained 10 percent of the Grundig apparatus sold in France.2 The parties
were ordered by the Commission to do nothing which would make it diffi-
cult for independent French dealers to obtain Grundig apparatus from
other sources.30 If valid, this would restrain Consten from enforcing its
French trademark rights to keep out genuine Grundig apparatus sold in
Germany.
Consten and Grundig appealed to the Community Court. One ground
of appeal was that this decision infringed on Article 222 of the Treaty:
"The Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States gov-
erning the system of property ownership." 3'
Before the Community Court issues a judgment, one of its members
known as the Advocate General delivers an opinion. It is rather like a
judgment at first instance, although the judgment of the Court invariably
follows, and there is rarely an opportunity for the parties to argue that he
is mistaken. 32 He gives his opinion on each of the issues, and frequently
cites precedents and academic works. Opinions are often more cogent
than the Court's judgments which are frequently the result of compro-
mise, since no dissenting or individual judgments are given. Judgments
are frequently very short and read like logical conclusions from selected
premises.
Advocate General Roemer considered only that since the Grundig
mark sufficed to indicate the origin of the apparatus to which it was af-
fixed, the use of the second Gint mark was an abuse of trade mark law
and, therefore, should be ineffective.3
By the time the Court issued its judgment, there was a crisis in the
Community. Its legislature had broken down as a result of the French
boycott of the meetings of the Council of Ministers.34 The pro-European
spirit of the founding fathers of the Community seemed to have died.
The only remaining pro-European institutions were the Commission and
the Court, and the former had been delegated only very minor legislative
powers. In a judgment that proved to be a turning point, not only for its
interpretation of Article 85 but also more generally, the Court distin-
28 Id. at 321, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. at 435.
" Re Grundig's Agreement [1964] Common Mkt. L.R. 489, 493.
,0 Id. at 504.
31 The construction of the words 'system of property ownership' has long been contro-
versial. It may merely reserve the right of member states to nationalize a sector of the econ-
omy. It clearly does not protect all property rights from the application of the Treaty.
3' Herzog, The Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the European Community, 41
WASH. L. REV. 438, 481 (1966).
33 Consten, [1966] E.C.R. 366, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. at 444.
3' See H. SMITH & P. HERZOG, supra note 7.
Vol. 14:7
LIMITATION OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS
guished the existence (or, in the original French text, to whom it might
belong) of the trademark right, which was protected by Article 222 from
its exercise, which remained subject to the Treaty, including Article 85.5
I have argued that the existence of a right consists of the various ways in
which it may be exercised, so the distinction cannot be drawn by logical
analysis save the extreme - when all methods of exercising the right are
restrained, it ceases to exist."6 This confers on the only body capable of
applying the distinction authoritatively, the Community Court, a very
free hand in deciding how far national property rights should be cut down
by the Treaty in general and, in particular, how far intellectual property
rights should be eliminated to speed up the integration of the market.
The legislative body might be in the doldrums, but the Court could de-
velop precedents which might prevent the Common Market from being
divided along national boundaries. It must be admitted, however, that it
does not seem to be widely accepted that the distinction was merely a
device to enable the Court to develop the law; the Commission, .whose
rulings are not as authoritative, follows the Court and asserts that certain
restrictions on competition do not go to the existence of intellectual prop-
erty rights.
37
In this paper, I shall consider the developments in the patent and
copyright cases, and briefly refer to developments in the trademark cases.
National laws confer the right to restrain the manufacture and/or first
marketing, and in some cases subsequeit sales and uses, in order to en-
courage selected types of investment.3 8 Favored forms of investment have
included technical research and development, the creation of an artistic
or literary work and the production of recordings, films and broadcasts.
There is a similar rationale for granting patent and copyright protection.
If copying were permitted, there would be little incentive to pay for the
original innovation and competition from free riders would make it
uneconomical.39
:5 Consten, [1966] E.C.R. 345, [19661 Common Mkt. L.R. at 476.
6 Korah, Dividing the Common Market Through National Industrial Property Rights,
35 MOD. L. REV. 634, 636 (1972).
37 It does not seem to accept the distinction as being a device by which the ultimate
court may change the law. It is submitted that its use by any other body tends to confuse
readers who may try to draw the distinction by logical analysis in novel situations instead of
realizing that the decision is based on policy considerations which only the Court can re-
solve authoritatively.
It has been suggested to the writer that the Commission is following American prece-
dents on the misuse of patents. No doubt some of its ideas are so inspired, but there is some
question whether this is the basis for its drawing the distinction between the existence and
exercise of the national right.
'a See generally, P. DEMARET, 2 PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS AND E.E.C. LAW 3-
8 (1978).
39 There are at least four theories in the case of patents: See F. MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC
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The justification of the right to restrain the sale of unauthorized
goods bearing the mark is different. The mark enables buyers to associate
with the goods bearing the mark the source from which they come. If this
could not be done simply, suppliers would be able to compete only on
price and on those elements of quality which are obvious on a cursory
inspection.40 Of course, goods that bear the same mark may not be identi-
cal. Many brand owners change the characteristics of the products over
time, in accordance with various factors including local tastes. Some
marks owned by multiple retailers are not peculiar to particular products.
The consumer is assured, however, that unless the mark or business has
been sold, the same person is able to prescribe the specification of the
goods to which it is applied. His experience with an earlier acquisition
will help him to select his purchase.
IV. PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
A. Parke Davis v. Probe141
Two years after Grundig, another action was brought primarily
under the competition rules. Parke Davis held patents in five member
States for the drug chloramphenicol, but had been unable to obtain pat-
ent protection in Italy, where, at that time, it was not possible to obtain
patent protection for drugs for human treatment.42 Parke Davis sought an
injunction to prevent the import into and sale in the Netherlands of
chloramphenicol coming from Italy.4s The Court did not enquire as to
whether the product had been made by third parties or by Parke Davis.
Even if it had been made by Parke Davis, it had no exclusive right in
Italy, and the drug would have had to have been sold at a price that could
be obtained in a competitive market, since third parties might legally
make and sell the drug there. The Dutch court asked the Community
Court to rule on the construction of the competition rules and also on
Articles 36 and 222.44 It should be noted that the Community Court is
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Study No.
15); Joliet, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods Within the E.E.C., 28 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 15, 30 (1975); Waelbroeck, The Effect of the Rome Treaty on the
Exercise of National Industrial Property Rights, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 99 (1976).
40 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Trademarks, Consumer Information and Barriers to
Competition, 1979, Policy and Planning Issues Paper, published by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, but representing the views of the author only.
41 Parke Davis v. Probel, (24/67) [1968] E.C.R. 55, [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. 47 [here-
inafter cited as Parke Davis].
42 Id. at 57, [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. at 48.
43 Id.
44 Id.
Vol. 14:7
LIMITATION OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS
required to rule abstractly on the interpretation of those provisions, and
it is then the task of the national court to apply the ruling to the facts of
the particular case.
Advocate General Roemer observed that if Parke Davis could not ex-
ercise its rights over goods made where it could not obtain protection,
there would be little value in its patent in any member State.45 There
would be no legal monopoly guaranteeing the inventor a chance for fair
renumeration, since the entire Common Market could be supplied by the
country denying patent protection. This would hinder technical progress,
since the costs of research and development could not be recovered. The
lack of a remedy would at least lead to inventions being kept secret wher-
ever possible.
The learned Advocate General may have slightly overstated the case.
Patents give an exclusive right to the holder, and if the invention is a
breakthrough, the holder may make very high profits, while if it does not
work, or the same task can be performed cheaply without using the pro-
tected invention, he may earn nothing. It is the interaction of supply and
demand that determines the reward, not fairness.46 The Court's judgment
related largely to Article 86; the exclusive rights conferred by a patent do
not necessarily lead to a dominant position because there may be compe-
tition from substitutes.4 7 Nor does charging higher prices where the
holder enjoys patent protection necessarily amount to abuse if such a po-
sition is in fact held.'8 Article 85 was not infringed in the absence of
collusion.49
This judgment has been widely interpreted as meaning that the use
of a patent to restrain imports from a country where a patent could not
be obtained is entirely legal. It did refer once, briefly, to the rules for the
free movement of goods and implied that the existence of such a right
was not undermined by Community law. The Court recognized that dif-
fering national patent laws require harmonization since they distort the
Common Market, but it did not refer to other policy considerations.
The next case to be decided by the Court was Sirena v. Eda,50 a
trademark case, similarly concerned with the construction of Article 85.
Its importance has diminished since 1970, so let us proceed to Deutsche
"I Id. at 77-78, [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. at 51.
4' Herr Roemer did suggest that if after allowing for unsuccessful research costs mo-
nopoly profits were being earned, the price charged might be subject to control under Arti-
cle 86 - which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. Parke Davis, [1968] E.C.R. 79,
[1968] Common Mkt. L.R. 56-7.
47 Parke Davis, [1968] E.C.R. 73, [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. at 59.
48 Id., at 72, [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. at 61.
41 Id., [1968] Common Mkt. L.R. at 60.
50 (40/70) [1971] E.C.R. 69, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 260.
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Grammophon v. Metro,51 the first case clearly based on the rules for the
free movement of goods.
B. Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro
Deutsche Grammophon was the holder of a right in a recording
under German law, analogous to a copyright.2 It supplied to its subsidi-
ary in France quantities of records protected under German law.5" These
were sold in France and eventually made their way back to Hamburg,
where Metro was selling them at less than the retail price then main-
tained by Deutsche Grammophon in Germany.54
Metro refused to sign an agreement to abide by Deutsche Gram-
mophon's resale prices so, in order to protect its resale price maintenance
system, Deutsche Grammophon had refused to supply Metro directly. In-
stead, it sought an injunction pursuant to its German property right to
restrain Metro from selling the protected goods.55 Under the German
property law it was clear that a sale either by the holder or with his con-
sent within Germany would exhaust his right; he could not control subse-
quent sales. It is not clear, however, whether a sale outside Germany - in
this case one made in France - would do so.as The Hamburg Court of
Appeal asked the Community Court to decide whether the German stat-
ute, conferring an exclusive distribution right, should be construed to al-
low the holder to restrain the sale in Germany of goods lawfully marketed
in another member State by or with the consent of the holder.57 The
Court reformulated the question to conform to the procedure under Arti-
cle 177,5s and its judgment focused on Articles 30 and 36.51
After referring to the distinction between the existence and exercise
of the right, developed earlier to limit the application of Article 222 but
now applied to Article 36, the Court stated that:
11 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro., (78/70]) [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] Common Mkt.
L.R. at 631 [hereinafter cited Deutsche Grammophon]; Alexander, CASHIER DE DROIT EURO-
PEAN 594 (1971); Van Empel, European Patent Conventions, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 13, 25
(1972); JOHANNES, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 56
(1976).
5 Deutsche Grammophon, [19711 E.C.R. 494, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 635.
Id. at 503, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 634.
Id., at 495, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 633. Resale price maintenance is no longer
permitted in West Germany, and indeed, may be contrary to Community Law. Until 1974,
however, an individual trademark owner was allowed by German law to maintain resale
prices subject to various provisions, one of which was that the system was 'watertight' -
enforced fully and without discrimination.
15 Id. at 503, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 634.
"' Id. at 504, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 635.
" Id., at 490, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 636.
11 Id. at 498, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 656.
59 Id. at 498-500, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 654-55.
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Although it permits prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of
products which are justified for the purpose of protecting industrial and
commercial property, Article 36 only admits derogations from that free-
dom to the extent to which they are justified for the purpose of safe-
guarding rights which constitute the specific subject matter of such
property.
12. If a right related to copyright is relied upon to prevent the marketing
in a Member State of products distributed by the holder of the right or
with his consent on the territory of another Member State on the sole
ground that such distribution did not take place on the national terri-
tory, such a prohibition, which would legitimize the isolation of national
markets, would be repugnant to the essential purpose of the Treaty,
which is to unite national markets into a single market.
That purpose could not be attained if, under the various legal systems of
the Member States, nationals of those States were able to partition the
market and bring about arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions
on trade between Member States.
13. Consequently, it would be in conflict with the provisions prescribing
the free movement of products within the common market for a manu-
facturer of sound recordings to exercise the exclusive right to distribute
the protected articles, conferred on him by the legislation of a Member
State, in such a way as to prohibit the sale in that State of products
placed on the market by him or with his consent in another Member
State solely because such distribution did not occur within the territory
of the first Member State.60
This judgment gave rise to a furor. Some commentators noted that in
France, Deutsche Grammophon enjoyed no industrial or commercial
property right in recordings, so the sale in France had not been protected,
and Parke Davis was the relevant authority.6 " It would, however, have
amounted to the tort of unfair competition for a pirate to have copied a
Deutsche Grammophon record and sold the copies. Some protection was
enjoyed in France, as has been recognized in the most recent cases in the
Community Court, although it was not as easily enforceable as in Ger-
many.6 2 Moreover, the Court did not refer to any lack of protection in
France, so it should not be interpreted as having said that it was
irrelevant.
What is the specific subject matter of a particular kind of intellectual
property? The French term objet specifique s refers both to the nature of
60 Id. at 500, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at 657-58.
6 See infra note 62.
62 DESBols, LE DRorr D'AUTmUR 208-09 (2d ed. 1966). The author cites no authority for
his view. See also Waelbroeck, supra note 39, at 105. In H. JOHANNES, supra note 51, at 56,
the author argued that the Court had rejected the reward theory since there were no parallel
rights in France corresponding to the German Copyright Statute.
63 The Community Court judges communicate with each other in French, and presum-
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the right and the reason for conferring it. Before the Common Market
was established, the function of such rights was to enable the holder to
charge what the market would bear, free from competition from those
taking advantage of his investment by copying a record or recording ses-
sion. To the extent that sales abroad did not exhaust the national right in
a high priced area, the holder could obtain the reward of a discriminating
monopolist. This is often higher than the profit earned by an individual
seller who can differentiate prices only in accordance with the cost of sup-
plying different classes of persons.
The Community Court, from whose judgment there is no appeal, has
been trying to reduce what it considers to be an improper and isolationist
use of such rights, while leaving the holder with some incentive to make
the initial investment. Unfortunately, however, the assertive style of its
judgments has enabled it to do so without considering the very complex
and unanswerable question: how large a profit is needed to call forth the
optimal amount of investment? After the Deutsche Grammophon judg-
ment, it seemed that the holder could protect its own sales by charging a
high price on first sale, or demanding a license royalty, but could not
charge more in one member State than in others without running the risk
of the higher priced market being overrun by parallel imports from the
lower priced country.
C. Centrafarm v. Sterling"
In Centrafarm v. Sterling, the Community Court extended its ruling
in Deutsche Grammophon to patents, and amplified the theory underly-
ing this branch of the law, without spelling out its reasoning sufficiently
to prevent another furor. Sterling, an American company, held patents in
several member states for a drug which its subsidiaries sold under the
mark 'Negram' 6 5 Its English subsidiary made and sold Negram in Eng-
land under a patent license. Sterling, which held the Dutch patent,
sought to restrain a purchaser of its English subsidiary from selling
Negram in the Netherlands, where the price was twice as high as in the
United Kingdom. 6 In a companion case, its Dutch subsidiary Winthrop
attempted to exercise the Dutch trademark rights, which it held, to ex-
clude the goods sold by its sister subsidiary in England. 17
ably agree on the French text which is then translated into the language of the case. Hence
the French text is the most important one to study.
" Centrafarm v. Sterling, (15/74) [1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at
480 [hereinafter cited as Sterling].
61 Id. at [1974] E.C.R. 1149, [19741 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 484.
66 Id.
17 Centrafarm v. Winthrop, (16/74) [1974] E.C.R. 1183 [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 480
[hereinafter cited as Winthrop].
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After observing that Article 36 derogates a fundamental principle of
Community law and should be restrictively interpreted, and reciting the
distinction between the existence and exercise of rights to explain Article
36, the Court stated:
9. In relation to patents, the specific subject matter of the industrial
property is 8 the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative ef-
fort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a
view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circula-
tion for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses to third
parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.69
From this passage, it seems that the specific subject matter refers not
only to the nature of the right, but also to the reason why the right is
granted - to reward inventions.70 The Court did not refer to any of the
other reasons for granting patent protection:7' encouraging invention or
publication in the patent specification as Herr Roemer had stressed in
Parke Davis, nor the natural law right of an inventor to the fruits of his
work.
The Court's description of the exclusive right was also selective. On
the other hand, a United Kingdom patent enables the holder to control
more than the first sale: he can control sales by anyone acquiring the pro-
tected articles with notice of a restriction.7 2 On the other hand, Profes-
seur Joliet has argued7 3 that in Belgium, if the manufacture has been law-
ful, the patentee may have no right to control the first sale. Moreover, a
patentee may have no right at all to manufacture or sell. The holder of an
improvement patent, for instance, may not be able to exploit it without
infringing on the rights of the holder of the original patent.7 4 A patent is
merely a right to restrain others from making or selling a product. It car-
ries no positive rights. The members of the Court are not patent experts.
They seem to be struggling to find a compromise between the free move-
ment of goods and the functions served by the various intellectual prop-
erty rights. As Professor Cornish observed, by defining the right without
reference to existing laws or giving any reasons for its definition, the
Court has asserted that control over subsequent sales cannot be justified
68 In the other authentic texts the Court inserted 'in particular' at this point. The defi-
nition given in Merck, see note 128 infra, was rather different.
8, Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1162, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
70 The Court spelled out the function of trademarks even more clearly in Centrafram v.
American Home Products, (3/78) [1978] E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 326.
71 See generally, supra note 39.
712 Patents Act, 1977, c.37, § 60.
73 Joliet, La Circulation de Produits Brevetes en Droit Belge, 64 REVUE DE DROIT IN-
TELLECTUAL 197 (1974).
74 Id.
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under Article 36.71
The Court continued by stating that an obstacle to the free move-
ment of goods may arise out of the provisions in national intellectual
property laws that a patentee's right is not exhausted by a sale outside
the particular member State. 6 The United Kingdom does not have a con-
cept of exhaustion. There is an implied right conferred on a licensee or
purchaser to sell the protected product freely, but it is subject to express
exclusion. The doctrine of exhaustion by sale in another member State
was widely thought to have become a part of Community law created by
the Court on the basis of the patent laws in some member States and
extended to apply to the Common Market as a whole. A license to sell in
one member State enables subsequent purchasers to sell throughout the
Common Market unless contractual terms, which qualify for an exemp-
tion under Article 85(3), 7 restrain the licensee.
By selecting those aspects of the patent laws of member States that
suited its purpose, the Court has substantially reduced the value of a pat-
ent right. It went on to clarify the impact of its definitions for some situa-
tions, but left much of the middle ground for future case law:
11. Whereas an obstacle to the free movement of goods of this kind may
be justified on the ground of protection of industrial property where such
protection is invoked against a product coming from a member state
where it is not patentable and has been manufactured by third parties
without the consent of the patentee... s
It thus expressly excludes the Parke Davis situation where patent protec-
tion was not obtainable in the country of export. But note that the Court
is very guarded. The use of a patent 'may be' justifiable in that situation:
no positive assertion is made in relation to Article 36: "and in cases where
there exist patents, the original proprietors of which are legally and eco-
75 Cornish, The Definitional Stop Aids the Flow of Patented Goods, J. Bus. L. 50, 52
(1975).
78 Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1162, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 507.
7 Exclusive manufacturing licenses have been exempted under art. 85(3) see, e.g., Re
Davidson Rubber, SPECIAL ED. J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 143) 31 (1972), but only where the
patentee and several licensees were free to sell throughout the common market. An export
ban has never yet been exempted, but the draft regulation on patent licences does envisage
export bans imposed to protect small licensees, provided that those to whom they sell can
freely resell throughout the common market, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 110) 10 (1979),
[1979] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. at 478. The writer has argued that where no one would be
prepared to take the risk of investing to manufacture without the protection of an export
ban, such a ban would not infringe art. 85(1). Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional
Validity- The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, 3 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT'L
L. AND Bus. 000 (1981).
78 Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1162-63, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
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nomically independent . . ."" This situation rarely arises in relation to
patents, since the first person to file in any one of a large number of coun-
tries, including all members of the Community, has the right to apply in
others within one year, claiming priority from the original filing. It could
arise, however, where rather different claims have been made in different
countries, enabling an innovator to obtain a patent in one country but not
in another. The situation is, however, more common in relation to
trademarks.80
A derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods is not,
however, justified where the product has been put onto the market in a
legal manner, by the patentee himself or with his consent, in the Member
State from which it has been imported, in particular in the case of a
proprietor of parallel patents."
The Court did not consider the position where a patent had not been
obtained in the country of origin, but could have been or where the abil-
ity to obtain a patent was doubtful. Nor did it consider the position
where a compulsory license had been granted by the patent office on the
grounds that there had been insufficient local exploitation.
The last passage quoted above does not correspond to paragraph 9,
in which the specific subject matter of a patent was defined in terms of
the possibility of gaining a reward. In fact, the Sterling group had had
such a chance and it is not clear whether, in light of paragraph 9, the
dicta should be limited to such a case.8 2 It is submitted that the appropri-
ate test should not be the consent of the holder, but the chance of ob-
taining a reward.8 3 True, a patentee can normally charge for his consent,
but there are anomolous situations. What if the marketing abroad was
done by a parent or sister subsidiary company of the holder in the higher
priced State? In that situation, the corporate group has had a chance to
obtain a monopoly profit without requiring the consent of the holder in
the country of import. The Court stated in paragraph 21 of the Sterling
judgment that it was irrelevant that the company which marketed the
drug in the United Kingdom was part of the same corporate group as the
Dutch holder. As Demeret observes, the original patentee had a chance to
7' Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1163, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
80 In Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie, (119/75) [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. 482, the Court confirmed that a trademark holder can restrain the sale of
goods to which a confusing mark has been attached by or with consent of the holder in
another member state.
81 Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1163, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
82 It has been argued that since the Court starts with the words 'in particular' it did
have in mind situations other than that in Sterling. It seems to the writer, however, danger-
ous to assume that its statement applied to any other particular situation.
83 P. DEMARET, 2 PATENTs, TERRITORIAL RESTRIcTIONS AND THE EEC LAW, ch. 4 (1978).
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
obtain a reward. In Centrafarm v. Winthrop,"4 the companion trademark
case, the Court ruled that the holder of the Dutch mark could not enforce
the mark against products to which the mark had been attached in an-
other member State with his consent without appearing to notice that the
Dutch holder, a sister subsidiary to the English holder, had not consented
to the sale in England. Of course each had obtained the rights with the
consent of Sterling, which may have been attributed to the Dutch subsid-
iary. Centrafarm had argued to the Court that the goods to which the
mark was applied in both countries were made under license from Ster-
ling, so there was no likelihood of public confusion as to the origin of the
goods.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Sterling case was the
Court's lack of concern with the amount of the reward. That the U.K.
price was half of that obtainable in the Netherlands was due, to the ex-
tent of a third, to the bargaining power of the Department of Health,
which pays for almost all of the drugs used in the United Kingdom, and
which could have taken advantage of the Crown use provisions in the
Patents Act of 1949.85 The more important reason for the price difference
was that the pound, by then floating after the end of the Bretton Woods
regime, had fallen and the Dutch guilder had appreciated on the interna-
tional currency markets.8 6 The Court was asked whether the position was
altered by the governmental measures adopted in the country of export
which were directed toward controlling the price of the product. The
Court stated that it is the task of the Community authorities to eliminate
factors which are likely to distort competition among member States, al-
though it gave no authority for this proposition. 7 It added that they
could not justify measures in another member State ". . . which are in-
compatible with the rules concerning the free movement of goods, partic-
ular in the field of industrial and commercial property."88
This ruling also created an uproar. If the prices in the country of
export did not allow the patentee a monopoly profit, there would be no
reward for the inventor anywhere in the Common Market unless he de-
cided not to market his goods in such countries. Had Sterling not ex-
ploited its invention in the United Kingdom, the drug probably would
have been made there under a compulsory license which, at that time,
was granted almost automatically under section 41 of the 1949 Patents
Act,89 or under the Crown use provisions.90 We will see that the question
84 Winthrop, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 480.
11 Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 46, revised to 30th April 1979.
81 See, F. PICK, PICK'S CURRENCY YEARBOOK 1977-79 at 468 and 666.
87 Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1164-65, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 505.
88 Id., at 1165, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 505.
89 Patents Act of 1949 supra note 85, at § 41.
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currently before the Community court is whether the import of products
so made could be restrained.91 If they could not be restrained, Sterling
would presumably have sold throughout the Common Market at very
nearly the same price, causing prices to rise in the low price countries and
fall in the high priced countries. Inability to discriminate may lead to
customers in the high priced countries benefiting at the expense of those
in the lower priced ones.
92
The judgment was not very clear as to what constituted the quantita-
tive restriction. Was it the patent law, or the injunction which the na-
tional court was asked to grant? If it was the Dutch patent law, then
under the Treaty of Accession of the United Kingdom it would be an
existing provision. There was no requirement that the provision be elimi-
nated as between the United Kingdom and the six original members until
1975. The Court rather surprisingly rejected this view without giving rea-
sons.9 3 Therefore, the restriction must be the injunction or the request
therefor.
9 4
Over the next seven years there were several important trademark
cases,9 5 but no additional judgments on patents and copyrights appeared
"' Patents Act of 1949, supra note 85, at § 46.
9' See text surrounding note 169 infra.
92 See Bishop, Price Discrimination Under Article 86: Political Economy in the Euro-
pean Court, 44 MOD. L. REv. 282, 286-87 (1981).
" Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1166, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 505.
"' See Joliet, supra note 39, at 27-8.
15 See generally, W. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE-
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS. In EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd. (51/75)
[1976] E.C.R. 811, [1976] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 235, the Community Court ruled that Arti-
cle 30 relates to the free movement of goods between member states, and so does not inhibit
the use of trade mark rights to prevent goods lawfully bearing the mark in the U.S.A. from
entering the Common Market. See the judgment of the German Supreme Court in Deutsche
Grammophon v. Firm Pop Import [1982] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 137, 146. The reasoning was
quite general, and appears to apply to all forms of intellectual property. Once, however, the
goods are lawfully imported into one member state, they may presumably circulate through-
out the Common Market. Under English law, a subsidiary cannot always sue, for trademark
infringement or passing off, a parallel importer who bought in the U.S. goods lawfully mar-
keted there by another company in the same group - Revlon v. Cripps [1980] Fleet Street
Rep. 85. CORNISH, see this note, at 570. The precise scope of the decision remains to be
worked out. Under German law, goods marketed abroad by the same concern may lawfully
be sold in Germany; Cinzano v. Java Kaffeegeschiitte [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 21. With
these loopholes in the trademark laws of member states, a group of companies cannot divide
the world by arranging for different companies within their group to hold the mark, even if
it treats the Common Market as a single territory.
Not all the trademark cases are based on the concept of Community exhaustion: in Van
Zuylen v. Hag, (192/73) [1974] E.C.R. 713, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 127; some coffee bearing
the mark was sold directly by the German holder in Belgium and Luxembourg and since the
marks were of common origin, the Court held that the Belgian holder could not sue, al-
though all links between the holders in the different member states had been severed by a
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until 1981.
D. Musik Vertrieb Membran and K-Tel International v. GEMA8
GEMA is a copyright protection society for Germany. On behalf of
its members it seeks to enforce their mechanical rights in musical works,
and charges a fee of eight percent of the German price on records made
there." In 1971, the Commission"8 held that GEMA abused its dominant
governmental decree sequestering the assets of enemy aliens.
Dansk Supermarked A.S. Arhus v. Imerco A.S. Clostrup Copenhagen (58/80) [1981]
E.C.R. 181 [hereinafter cited as Dansk], involved copyright and trademarks as well as unfair
competition. Imerco had commissioned some services of china, bearing its name, and
painted with Danish castles to such high quality standards that 20% of production failed to
qualify. The English manufacturer was allowed to sell the seconds in England and did so.
When a Danish supermarket acquired them from a parallel importer and offered them for
sale at prices lower than Imerco, the latter sued for copyright and trademark infringement
and for breach of a marketing law that served some of the functions of unfair competition
law and protected consumers. Advocate General Caportorti considered that the Court had
already established that neither copyright or trademark rights could be relied upon to pre-
vent the marketing in Denmark of Services placed on the market in another member state
with the consent of Imerco, and the Court followed him.
He went on to consider the Italy v. Gilli (788/79) [1980] E.C.R. 2071, [1981] 1 Common
Mkt. L.R. 146 and the Cassis de Dijon cases, where the Court had gone beyond Article 36,
and held that national measures might remain valid despite Article 30, provided that they:
"... serve a purpose which is in the general interest and such as to take precedence over
the requirements of the free movement of goods, which constitutes one of the fundamental
rules of the Community." Casis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 664; [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at
510. The Danish court might take into account whether the sale of substandard services,
bearing the Imerco name, might harm its reputation; this seemed unlikely to Signor
Caportorti, since Imerco had been prepared to allow the china to be sold in the U.K. Loss
might also be caused if the sale took place in such a manner that consumers might believe
that the quality was identical with the china being sold by Imerco itself. This would depend
on the packaging and so forth. In relation to the marketing law, the Court ruled:
That the importation into a Member State of goods lawfully marketed in another
Member State cannot as such be classified as improper or unfair commercial prac-
tice, without prejudice however to the possible application of legislation of the
State of importation against such practices on the ground of the circumstances or
methods of offering such goods for sale as distinct from the actual fact of importa-
tion; and that an agreement between individuals intended to prohibit the importa-
tion of such goods may not be relied upon or taken into consideration in order to
classify the marketing of such goods as an improper or unfair commercial practice.
It may be that more protection can be obtained from the law of unfair competition than
from copyright or trademark law. Had Imerco forbidden the English manufacturer to allow
any purchaser from him to market within 30 kms. of any of its stores, might such marketing
have been restrained on grounds of unfair competition?
" (55 and 57/80) Musik Vertrieb Mebran and K-Tel International v. Gema [1981] 2
Common Mkt. L.R. 50 [hereinafter cited as Musik Vertrieb]. Hoffman, Copyright and the
Treaty of Rome - Recent Developments, [1981] 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Rav. 254.
97 Id. at 50.
" Re Gema, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. D35. The conflicting national decisions as to
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position by charging an eight percent royalty on imported records;
records on which royalties had already been paid in the country of first
sale. The Commission, however, decided that it would not be abusive for
GEMA to charge the difference between the royalty paid elsewhere and
eight percent of the German price.9 The Commission was not competent
to intervene under Article 30, and did not do so. In 1981, both the Com-
munity Court and its Advocate General, Mr. Warner, stated that the
charge on imports did infringe on the rules for the free movement of
goods, a matter which was not the subject of the Commission decision.10 0
GEMA would not be able to charge the differential without relying on its
members' rights to restrain the import or marketing of the protected
goods. The enforcement of the copyright was a quantitative restriction
contrary to Article 30 and could not be justified. Allowing the copyright
holders to exploit the differences in retail prices in the different member
States was quite incompatible with the concept of a Common Market.
The French Government had argued that Article 30 did not apply to
copyright, which includes the author's right to object to distortion, muti-
lation, or other alterations of his work-the droits morals.10 1 The Court
observed that copyright included the right to exploit the work by grant-
ing licenses, and that it was that aspect of copyright which was at issue.1°2
The copyright was therefore subject to Articles 30 and 36.103 The Court
also rejected the argument of the Belgian and Italian Governments that,
until national laws were harmonized, the principle of territoriality for
copyright should be preserved. 0 4 Once a record has been marketed in the
United Kingdom, by or with the consent of the copyright owner, anyone
may make his own recording and sell it thereafter upon paying a statu-
tory royalty of 6 percent of the net United Kingdom selling price. I° 5
the validity of such post-licensing are cited in Reimer, Copyright and Free Movement of
Goods, 12 INT'L R. IND. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 493, 503-05 (1981).
:, Re Gema, [1971] Common Mkt. L.R. at D61.
,:0 Musik Vertrieb, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 55, 63.
101 Id. at 55-56.
102 Id. at 62-63.
103 It had been feared that copyright might not be treated as 'industrial or commercial
property' the protection of which may amount to a justification under Article 36.
104 Musik Vertrieb, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L. R. at 65.
'01 Id. at 51. The factual situation is not made clear. We are told that a sister subsidi-
ary of K-tel had made records in the U.K. under a license granted by the copyright holder.
Yet the referring court, Advocate General and Community Court refer to records placed on
the market, or which have been put into circulation in the country of export and to exhaus-
tion. Had the records been made by the undertaking wishing to sell in Germany, there
would be no exhaustion, since there would have been no sale in the U.K. Does a transfer
between companies in the same group affect the position? Or is the Court departing from
the concept of exhaustion on which it had laid stress in Centrafarm v. Sterling, as it did in
the earlier trade mark ruling in Van Zuylen v. Hag. It is submitted that the Court was
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The Court and Advocate General accepted that given the statutory li-
cense provisions, no one would pay more than 61/ percent for a contrac-
tual license, as he might be undercut by competitors relying on the com-
pulsory license.
Advocate General Warner pointed out that in Parke Davis:
The Court did not examine whether the products had been marketed in
Italy by the patentee or with his consent. It is implicit in the judgment
that that was in the circumstances immaterial, as indeed it must have
been. There can be no exhaustion of rights where no rights exist. Putting
it in another way, the patentee had had no opportunity in Italy of exact-
ing a reward for the invention. 108
After referring to the article by Professor Wealbroeck, 107 he con-
cluded that Deutsche Grammophon and Sterling did not decide to the
contrary. Had there been no copyright protection at all in the United
Kingdom, he was satisfied that GEMA should have been entitled to en-
force its members' rights under German law. He considered that it should
be entitled to exercise the composers' rights under German law to the
extent necessary to counteract the limiting effect of the statutory licence.
He distinguished Centrafarm v. Sterling by delineating between 'ordinary
price control measures, which merely affect market conditions, more or
less temporarily, and a provision that cuts down the relevant industrial or
commercial right itself."0 8
However, it is submitted that in, Sterling, it was largely the Crown
use and compulsory licensing provisions in the 1949 Patents Act that en-
abled the Department of Health to negotiate low prices for drugs re-
quired for the national health service. Even so, the attempt to circumvent
a much criticized aspect of the earlier case can only be commended.
The Advocate General did not suggest that GEMA should be entitled
to the difference between 61 percent of the U.K. price and 8 percent of
the German price-that would be to disregard the common market. He
thought it should be entitled to the difference between the 6 / percent
and what would have been obtainable in the United Kingdom in the ab-
sence of the statutory license.10 9 Theoretically that may well have been
dealing with the abstract question asked by the referring court, and that its ruling should be
confined to records bought from the license who could not be made to pay more than the
royalty provided for by section 8. The referring court, the Bundesgerichtshoff, accepted this
view it referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, directing an investigation into
whether the records had been sold in the U.K. outside the holder's corporate group. If not,
it ruled that the Community Court's judgment would not be applicable. See, EUROPEAN LAW
LETTER 8-9 (Dec. 1981).
"' Musik Vertrieb, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 62-63.
107 Waelbroeck, supra note 39, at 99.
108 Musik Vertrieb, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 61.
109 Id.
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the correct measure, but as Mr. Warner recognized, it would have been a
difficult test for the national court to apply.110
The Court did not follow Mr. Warner's opinion. It referred to Ster-
ling and at paragraph 24 repeated its statement that:
the existence of a disparity between national laws which is capable of
distorting competition between member-States cannot justify the main-
tenance or introduction by a member-State of measures which are in-
compatible with the rules concerning the free movement of goods. Such
disparities must be abolished by the means provided for to that end by
the Treaty, and in particular by the harmonization of national laws."1
Harmonization of laws has proved slow and time-consuming. No doubt
the Court wished to cut the Gordian knot. The French Government had
argued that not to permit the author of a musical work to enforce his
copyright, when his rights had been cut down by United Kingdom legisla-
tion, would contravene Article 13 of the Berne Convention 1 2 which took
precedence over the Treaty by virtue of Article 234."1' General Warner
thought, obiter, that this construction was wrong because Article 234 ap-
plied not to Treaties among member States, but only to those with other
countries.1 4 Based on his view of Article 36, it was not necessary to de-
cide the question. The Court did not mention the Convention, but since it
considered that the use of the rights was not justified, it must have con-
cluded either that its decision did not contravene the Berne Convention,
or that the EEC provisions took precedence in relation to trade between
member States, even if non-member States had ratified the Convention.
The Court's disregard of legal differences between the laws of mem-
ber States may generate pressure by industries concerned with their na-
tional governments that may speed up harmonization. In some industries,
however, although probably not this one, the position meanwhile may be
unfair and distort the pattern of manufacture and trade. The United
Kingdom Government green paper, Reform of the Law Relating to Copy-
right, designs and Performers' Protection25 indicates that it would wel-
come comments on the implications of the judgment on the maintenance
of the statutory license. It suggests repeal, since 'it is probable that the
recording of music would be better left to the operation of the competi-
tive forces of the market."' The Deputy Director General of IFPI has
objected stating that:
110 Id. at 62.
Id. at 66-67.
" Berne Convention, entered into force June 1, 1928, 47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834.
US Musik Vertrieb, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 61.
"4 Musik Vertrieb, supra note 96, at [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 61.
"5 CMND No. 8302 (1981).
"I' Id. at 18.
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This view shows a lack of knowledge or understanding of the situation in
Continental Europe, where the absence of a statutory license of the U.K.
type has given rise to the BIEM system, a notable feature of which is
that all producers of sound recordings are licensed in any one territory
on precisely the same terms.
117
Earlier in the same case note he stated:
The practical consequences of this decision are still emerging as far as
the European record industry is concerned. For some it may be advanta-
geous to import more records from the U.K., but it should be
remembered that the retail price (less tax) on which the 6.25 per cent
royalty is calculated under the U.K. statutory license system is not low
by European standards. U.K. prices are no longer relatively low, as they
were some years ago, and deductions (particularly for LP covers and cas-
settes) bring down the effective royalty rate in Continental countries to
just over 7 percent, but this does not appear to influence the volume of
exports from Ireland to other EEC countries. However, the trend for
companies operating in more than one country to concentrate their man-
ufacturing facilities will undoubtedly accelerate now that the last possi-
ble obstacle to the free movement of records within the EEC has been
removed.118
E. Merck11
Patents are probably more important to the pharmaceutical industry
than to any other industry. The firms spend a very large part of their
turnover on discovering the new drugs and developing them through the
safety tests now imposed by most large countries. Once developed and
passed by national authorities, a drug is often fairly easy to copy. Conse-
quently, manufacturers rely heavily on the possibility of bringing in-
fringement suits. If the value of patent protection is reduced by Commu-
nity law, drug manufacturers may be expected to make more negative
decisions both as to the substances to be tested for therapeutic properties
and the drugs already discovered and being developed to pass the strin-
gent safety requirements.
Merck makes and markets throughout the Common Market a medic-
ament, known as 'Moduretic', used mainly for treating hypertension.' It
has patents protecting the drug itself in the United Kingdom, Eire, Ger-
117 Thomas, The MembranIK-Tel Cases: U.K. Statutory Licensing Model Fees for the
E.E.C.?, 8 EUR. INDUSTRIAL PROP. REv. 241 (1981).
118 Id.
119 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Stephar B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler, [1981] 3 Common
Mkt. L.R. 463 [hereinafter cited as Merck].
0 Id. at 465.
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many, France, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands,'1 21 and process
patents in the same countries other than Germany and Denmark. Its
Dutch patents, both for the substance and the process, for producing it
have a priority date of 1962, at which time it was impossible to patent the
drug in Italy."' The Italian law denying patents for pharmaceuticals was
quashed by the Italian Constitutional Court in 1978,128 but by then the
invention was no longer novel and legislation allowing late application for
Italian patents had not been passed. Stephar bought 'Moduretic', which
was made and sold by Merck in Italy, and imported it for sale in the
Netherlands at prices below those charged there by Merck.124 Merck
brought an infringement action under its Dutch patents, and the Rotter-
dam court referred to the Community Court the question of whether the
enforcement of the Dutch patent would infringe on the rules for the free
movement of goods.1 15
The arguments in favor of allowing enforcement of the Dutch patent,
although clearly presented to the Court, were rejected with little express
consideration. It is unlikely that the judgment will be reversed unless the
membership of the Court is altered by the retirement or appointment of
at least one judge. The judges do not give individual opinions, so it is not
possible to say how many, or which, approved the opinion.
Commentators were divided as to whether Community law does per-
mit the use of a national patent to restrain the import and sale of prod-
ucts protected in the country of import, but which were incapable of pro-
tection in the country from which they came, if they were first put into
circulation by the person holding a patent in the country of import. Al-
most all commentators agreed, however, that it should permit a remedy
under national law." 8 Were Merck to charge a price in Italy that would
reflect its research and development costs, other manufacturers would be
free to manufacture and sell there at prices that would undercut Merck.
The company, therefore, would be unable to obtain a monopoly profit.
Merck argued that under Dutch law, a sale abroad does not exhaust
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 466.
125 Id. at 466-67.
126 Alexander, L'Ftablissemant du March Commun et le Problame des Brevets Paral-
l~les, [1968] REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROiT EUROPAAN 513; Alexander, Industrial Property
Rights and the Establishment of the European Common Market 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
35, 42 (1972); Joliet, supra note 39, at 37; Korah, National Patents and the Free Movement
of Goods Within the Common Market 38 Mod. L. Rev. 333, 336 (1975); Waelbroeck, supra
note 39, at 105-07; H. Ullrich, Competition Law in Western Europe and the U.S.A. CM/C,
para. 34 (Ed. D.J. Gijlstra); P. DEmARET, 2 PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS AND EEC
LAW, chapter 4 (1978). JOHANNES, supra note 51, at 47 and 57.
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the patentee's right and, a fortiori, should not do so when the sale abroad
occurred where patents were not obtainable, and where there was no ex-
clusive right of exhaustion. 127 The law in Italy and the Netherlands was
different. 128 Not to allow enforcement in the Netherlands would be con-
trary to the specific subject matter of the Dutch patent and enforcement
would not amount to arbitrary discrimination contrary to the second sen-
tence of Article 36.129 Merck pointed out that in the Cassis de Dijon
case, 30 and others which followed, the Court has accepted some limita-
tions to Article 30-some reserved national powers-that go beyond those
listed in Article 36.' In Cassis de Dijon, in the absence of common rules
relating to the production and marketing of alcohol the Court stated in
its judgment:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in
question must be accepted insofar as those provisions may be recognized
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of pub-
lic health, the fairness of commercial transactions, and the defense of the
consumer.
132
In that case, the Court confirmed that the concept of 'quantitative
restriction' includes measures that do not distingush formally between
imports and locally made products, but bear more heavily on imports.133
At the same time, however, the Court limited the concept by reading into
Article 30 this reservation for national law, which is not identical with the
express reservations set out in Article 36.
Merck argued by analogy that the interests expressly mentioned in
Article 36 should be reserved.'3 Moreover, the Italian law should give
way to the Dutch since Italy was the only Common Market State where
drugs could not be patented.'3 3 Several commentators have reasoned that
the free movement of goods extends to the whole Common Market ap-
proach to price control, as well as to other measures used by some mem-
ber States to limit prices."36 Merck argued that the Dutch law was neces-
sary and not excessive; that it served a general interest sufficiently
127 Merck, [1981] Common Mkt. L.R. at 481.
128 Id. at 480.
12. Id., at 481-82.
130 Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 494.
Id. at 660-64, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 510.
.32 Id. at 652, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 508-09.
1M2 Id. at 660-64, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 510.
"' Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472-73.
131 Id. at 475.
136 Paulis, The Danis Case: Reconciling Statutory Price Controls with the Free Move-
ment of Goods, 1 EUR. Comp. L. REv. 163, 174 (1980).
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imperative to justify inclusion in the exceptions expressly laid down in
Article 36.117 Merck amplified its arguments by reiterating the reasons for
which the Italian Constitutional Court had declared that patents should
be allowed for drugs. Merck then analyzed the judgment in Sterling and
observed that in that case, the Court was dealing with parallel patents
and that only in that event would paragraph 11 of the judgment in Ster-
ling, denying the enforcement of a patent to restrain the import and sale
of products marketed by the holder in another member State, be compat-
ible with paragraph 9, defining the specific subject matter of a patent in
terms of reward.1 38 It also noted that the headnote to the case prepared
by the Court referred to parallel patents.3 9
Merck then analyzed the other case law of the Court and, at a time
when the Court had not yet delivered its judgment in Membran, stressed
Advocate General Warner's opinion in Membran that there can be no ex-
haustion where there is no exclusive right. 40 Merck also referred to the
Convention for a Community patent.14 1 Such a patent is exhausted only if
marketed with the 'express' consent of the holder.14 2 The Commission,
however, observed that this was a compromise solution to a dispute be-
tween the member States and the Commission, and that the provisions of
that Convention were expressly made subject to the EEC Treaty.1 43 Ad-
vocate General Reischl dismissed the argument, not on the ground that
the signed Convention had not yet been ratified, but because it repre-
sented a compromise between divergent views.1 44 Merck's arguments were
supported by the French and U.K. Governments.24 5 Both Governments
stressed the reward provided by the patent system in order to encourage
innovation. 4  The U.K. Government defined this as "the ability of the
patentee to fix the price of the patented product free from the competi-
tive forces as would exist but for the exclusive rights given by the pat-
ent. 1 47 The Government added that it would result in deprivation to
both Italian patients and Merck if Merck were to discontinue Italian sales
'17 Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472-73.
3"8 Id. at 480.
1"I As stated in note 68, however in translations of the judgment into languages other
than English, the Court prefaced its remarks by the words 'in particular'. From this it has
been argued that the Court did have in mind cases where there were no parallel patents. If
so, its language was obscure and may have been due to a compromise between the judges.
10 Transcript for Merck v. Stephar at page 17. On file at Case Western Reserve
University.
11 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976).
142 Id. See also, infra note 164.
143 Id.
144 Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 477.
'4 Id. at 481.
146 Id. at 481.
14 Transcript, supra note 140, at 23.
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in order to maintain higher prices elsewhere. 48
The most telling point made by the parallel importer, Stephar, was
the difference in prices charged in the countries that do grant patent pro-
tection. Taking the German price as 100, the prices charged by Merck in
the other countries were: Netherlands 140, Belgium 102, Denmark 76,
United Kingdom 58 and France 51.1"1 The Italian price of 56 was not the
lowest. The reasons for these differences are not given in the case, but in
France, there are price controls' 50 and in the United Kingdom the Na-
tional Health Service is the main user of drugs, and enjoys bargaining
power based partly on the size of its requirements, and partly on the
Crown use provisions in the Patents Act.15 In the higher priced market of
Germany, however, there are rules dividing the functions of retailers and
wholesalers which may have delayed or prevented the development of low
cost forms of distribution. 52 In Belgium and the Netherlands there is a
tradition of cartels, which bind entire markets from manufacture or im-
port to retailing. 5 ' The writer has no information as to whether this pat-
tern extends to the pharmaceutical industry. There have been no EEC
proceedings published. It seems that in some member States, prices are
depressed by government action, but it may be that in others, they are
kept up by public regulation or cartel activity. The possibility was not
investigated by the Court.
The defendant in the Dutch court also argued that Merck had had a
choice; it was not necessary for Merck to market its drug in Italy. Since
Merck elected that course of action, it must be presumed that the price in
Italy gave Merck a reasonable return on its investment in innovation.'"
This seems to the writer to confuse ex ante with ex post considerations.
Inthe absence of the possibility of patent protection there was no way in
which Merck could obtain a return on that investment from sales in Italy.
It would pay to sell there if Merck were able to recover the marginal costs
of each sale. If, however, there were insufficient patent protection any-
where in the world, it might not have made the investment initially. The
United Kingdom Government argued that there was no policy reasons for
discouraging Merck from selling Moduretic in Italy. 5 5 Indeed, Italian pa-
tients would benefit from its sale there, and to the extent that Merck
148 Transcript, supra note 140, at 25.
9 Id. at 26.
1"0 B. ABEL-SMITH AND P. GRANDJEAT, PHARMACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION, 45 Social Policy
Series #38, printed by the Commission of the European Communities (1978).
Patents Act of 1949 supra note 85, at § 46.
152 Compare, SMITH & GRANDJEAT, supra note 150, at 53, citing the complex rules deal-
ing with profit margins for wholesalers & pharmacists.
153 But cf., SMITH AND GRANDJEAT, supra note 150, at 44.
' Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 481.
Transcript, supra note 140, at 25.
Vol. 14:7
LIMITATION OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS
could earn profits, it might recover some contribution towards its devel-
opment costs.
The Commission argued that a patent does not guarantee protection
to an inventor. 5 6 He has only a chance, not a certainty, of making a mo-
nopoly profit.157 This may be true, but until now that chance depended
only on commercial considerations: the innovatory expenditure might not
produce useful results, another firm might apply for a patent with an ear-
lier priority date, substitutes might be available at lower costs. If Merck
is not allowed to enforce its patent to restrain the sale where it has a
patent, then it has no chance of earning a profit to pay for its innovation
on sales it makes in a member State where patent protection is not
available.
The Court's judgment barely comments on this extensive argument.
After reciting the parties' arguments quite clearly, and considering its
judgment in Sterling, the Court redefined the specific subject matter of a
patent: "That right of first placing a product on the market enables the
inventor . . . to obtain the reward for his creative effort without . * *
guaranteeing that he will obtain such a reward in all circumstances.' 5 8
The patentee can choose whether and where to market the resulting
product and whether to market it where he enjoys no protection. If he
does sell in such a member State, he must accept the consequences of his
choice in relation to the circulation of the product within the Common
Market. 59 This comment is a conclusion and not a reason for refusing to
permit the patentee to enforce his rights elsewhere. The patentee had not
enjoyed an exclusive right to first marketing in this case. The Court con-
tinued by indicating that to allow enforcement of the Dutch patent would
involve the isolation of national markets, contrary to objectives of the
Treaty. It cited the Membran judgment and a trademark case in support
of its views. 60
It seems that the Court may have thought that the matter had al-
ready been decided in the Sterling case, when the Court refused to take
into consideration the measures of the U.K. Government to reduce the
price of the drugs. The case had, however, been subjected to so much
criticism by almost everyone that many had hoped that the Court would
reconsider the matter. Merck's case was stronger than Sterling's in that
Sterling did enjoy some protection in the United Kingdom: the 'Crown
use' and compulsory license provisions, if exercised, would have left Ster-
" Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 473.
107 Id.
1"8 Id. at 481.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 482.
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ling with royalty payments and some return on its innovation. 1 " There is
a case to be made for denying patent protection if the high priced mar-
kets, as well as those where government measures depress prices, are dis-
torted, but no attempt to establish such distortions was made. No one can
say how much protection is needed to encourage the optimal expenditure
on research and development, and no attempt to do so was made by the
Court. Once the Court had refused to follow advocate General Warner's
opinion in Musik Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, there was little hope of
allowing Merck to enforce its Dutch patent.
F. Other Issues
1. Where a patent could have been obtained in the country of
export
It may be that these precedents encompass the situation where pat-
ents could have been obtained in the country of export but were not ap-
plied for; although a requirement that an inventor should apply for pat-
ents in each member State if he wants protection in any makes neither
commercial nor economic sense. It adds to the expense of obtaining pat-
ent protection, which is particularly burdensome for small firms - usu-
ally helped by the Community institutions.
Although patents for drugs are not available in Italy, the judgment in
Merck remains important. Greece, which acceded to the Community at
the beginning of 1981,182 does not grant product patents for pharmaceuti-
cal products. Although there is some protection through process patents
it is often difficult to enforce them in practice. The situation is similar in
Spain, which has applied to join the Community, where it seems to be
particularly difficult to enforce a process patent.6 3 The problem can also
arise for other products, when the patent expires in one member State
before it expires in another, or where different claims have been made in
existing patents in different member states.
2. Expiration of a patent in the country of export
If a third party should manufacture and sell a product after the pat-
ent in that country has expired, it is not entirely clear whether the prod-
uct could be excluded from other countries.'" The Parke, Davis case was
16 Patents Act of 1949 supra note 85, at § 46.
162 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic, supra note 10.
11- F. Lobo, Monopolistic Structures & Industrial Analysis in Spain: The Case of the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 9 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES, 663, 675-77.
1" 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976). Article 32 provides for Community wide
exhaustion once goods have been sold within the Common Market with the express consent'
of the patentee. See also article 93 which provides for the precedence of the provisions of
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decided under the competition rules, not those for the free movement of
goods. The judgment in Sterling stated merely that the use of a patent in
such circumstances may be justifiable, not that it is. Nevertheless, the
judgment in Merck stressed that by choosing to sell in Italy, Merck had
subjected the drug to free circulation. 165 Many reasonable expectations
would be dashed, should the Court not permit the use of a patent where
the goods were first marketed by a third party in a country where no
exclusive rights could be obtained. The patentee may have obtained a
substantial reward for its invention while the patent in the country of
export continued in force, but the particular article imported would have
earned no reward and would be sold in a market where the legislature
had provided protection for a longer period of time. If the patentee can-
not exercise its patent rights in this situation, once the first Common
Market patent expires, no patents will be effective for products that can
be cheaply transported.
3. Compulsory licenses
Additional issues have arisen, but have not yet been decided. In
Pharmon v. Hoechst,6 6 a court in Rotterdam asked the Community
Court whether a patent in the Netherlands may be enforced to exclude
goods sold by a compulsory licensee in the United Kingdom. Shortly
afterwards, the referring judgment was also subject to an appeal and in
this case too, the Community court agreed to delay its ruling. Conse-
quently, the issue will not be decided in the near future. In such a case
the patentee has presumably received some recompense for his innovative
investment in the form of a royalty, albeit less than he would have been
able to obtain normally without competition from the licensee. The pat-
entee certainly did not consent to manufacture or sale by the licensee
who obtained the patent rights from the Comptroller General of Pat-
ents.1 67 The situation is not dealt with in paragraph 11 of the judgment in
Sterling."8 Prohibiting the use of the Dutch patent in such circumstances
the EEC Treaty. This question was posed to the court in Dymo v. Etiketten Service, 813, 79
23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C17) 10 (1980), but the court has agreed to suspend proceedings
while an appeal is heard in the Netherlands.
'" Merck, [1981] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 481.
', Pharmon v. Hoechst (271/80) 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C347) 28 (1980).
167 The case would be more arguable had a license been given by the patentee under
threat of applying for a compulsory license. There may be something to be said for letting
the would-be licensee go to the Comptroller for his license. The Court was more realistic in
Musik Vertrieb in treating an express license as a statutory one, but the statutory license
was automatic for mechanical rights, whereas compulsory licenses under a patent are less
easily obtained.
I" Sterling, [1974] E.C.R. 1162-63, [1974] Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
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would enable the British official to grant compulsory licenses. 16 9 Thus far,
member States have agreed in the Community Patent Convention (which
has not yet been ratified by all of the signatory States and, therefore, is
not yet in force) not to grant compulsory licenses for failure to manufac-
ture within the State where demand is being met by goods imported from
another member State. 170 This should enable a patentee to manufacture
on an economic scale for the supply of the whole.17 1
4. Copyright in designs
United Kingdom law is peculiar17 1 in treating as a breach of copy-
right in a drawing, the copying of the functional configuration of a three
dimensional object based on the drawing. Therefore, many spare parts
enjoy copyright protection lasting for the artist's life plus 50 years. Brit-
ish Leyland, the large vehicle manufacturer, has been relying on copy-
right protection for many of the spare parts for its vehicles to restrain the
sale of parts made by third parties within the United Kingdom or in
l6g B.M.W. Belgium v. Commission (32 & 36-82/78) [1979] E.C.R. 2435, [1980] 1 Com-
mon Mkt. L.R. 370.
170 19 O.J. EuR. COMM., supra note 164, at arts. 47 and 82.
In the U.K. this provision may be implemented by Order in Council made under
section 54 of the Patents Act 1977. That Act repeals the provisions in earlier statutes for
obtaining compulsory licenses more or less automatically for food and drugs, but under sec-
tion 48(3) such licenses may be obtained for all products where the invention is not being
used in the U.K. to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable, or when demand is not
being met on 'reasonable terms' (whatever that may mean), or is being met to a substantial
extent by importation.
Can it be argued that this final possibility encourages a patentee to manufacture in the
U.K. rather than import from another member state and so bears more heavily on imported
products, contrary to the Cassis de Dijon ruling?
The issue was raised slightly differently in Re Heathways Machine Sales Ltd. and
Heathway Engineering Co. Ltd. [1981] Common Mkt. L.R. 379. The patentee argued that
the demand in the U.K. had been met from Eire, and that to grant a compulsory license on
the ground that the demand in the U.K. had been met substantially by imports from a
member state would discourage interstate trade. Whitford, J. in a judgment delivered on
June 18, 1981 said that even if imports from Eire were reduced because of the competition
the patentee would meet in the U.K., this would not be a quantitative restriction or a mea-
sure of equivalent effect. The compulsory license would encourage competition and be in
accord with the general concept of the Treaty. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was
refused both by Whitford, J. and the Court of Appeal, without any reference being made to
the Community court, so the case can go no further.
172 Artistically meritorious designs may be registered in the U.K. under the Design
Copyright Act and enjoy some protection for 15 years, but if incapable of registration, it was
unanimously held by the Court of Appeal in Dorling v. Honor Marine [1965] Ch. 1; [1964]
R.P.C. 160, that any drawings on which they are based and the objects themselves enjoy
artistic protection for far longer. See, e.g., CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS COPY-
RIGHT TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, 414.
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other member states where there is no such protection.17 The compatibil-
ity of this protection with Community law was raised in British Leyland
v. T.I. Silencers.
17 4
5. Free trade agreements
The Community has entered into Free Trade Agreements with the
former members of Economic Free Trade Association (EFTA) 75 along
with other countries. Most of these Agreements contain provisions rather
similar to Articles 30 and 36,176 and the question arises whether these
provisions of the Treaties directly affect the law of the member States of
the Community or of the other party to the Agreement. 17 7 The matter has
arisen in relation to a copyright license to manufacture and sell only in
Portugal, where records were inexpensive. A purchaser from the licensee
imported the records to sell in the United Kingdom, and when sued for
copyright infringement claimed that Articles 14 and 23 of the Free Trade
Agreement178 between the Community and Portugal had a direct effect in
the United Kingdom. In Polydor v. Harlequin Records1 7 9 the Court of
Appeal thought that these Articles of Agreement might well do so, but
the issue of whether or not they have an effect in Portugal was referred to
the Community Court. It is being argued that these Agreements, quite
unlike the Community Treaties, should be treated like most international
173 British Leyland v. T.I. Silencers [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 75, 77.
174 Id. In British Leyland, the defendants made spare parts in the U.K. for Leyland
vehicles. British Leyland claimed a copyright on some of these spare parts. T.I. Silencers did
not wish to pay royalties for a license and argued that the unusual scope of U.K. copyright
law was contrary to Community law. If the defendants had to pay a royalty to make such
parts in the U.K., they would be at a disadvantage when exporting to other member states,
where local manufacturers would be free to make and sell parts without a license. They also
claimed that the copyright royalties of 6% and the 3% royalty on all Leyland parts were an
abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. The High Court
struck out these defenses as not being arguable, but they have been restored by the Court of
Appeal, and a reference to the Community Court at some stage seems likely.
The British Government has issued a green paper, REFORM OF THE LAW RELATING TO
COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PERFORMERS' PROTECTION, CMND. No. 8302, with a view to discus-
sions whether to abolish the protection for functional designs. At paragraph 12 it argues
that the protection is against British interests, but does not mention that it may be contrary
to Community law or policy.
175 E.P. Wellenstein, The Free Trade Agreements Between the Enlarged European
Communities and the EFTA - Countries, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 137-38 (1973).
M See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 30 and 36.
177 See M. Waelbroeck, 'L' effect direct de l'accord relatif aux echauges commerciaux
du 22 Joliet 1972 entre la Communeute Economique Europeanne et la Confederation
Suisse, [1973] ANNUNIRE SUISSE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 113.
171 Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops, (270/80) [1980] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 413.
179 Id.
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treaties which have no direct effect on member States.'80 Those arguing
for this position provide for enforcement through a mixed committee,
which eliminates the need for direct effect to be given to them. The Court
has decided that these provisions in the Treaty between the EEC and
Portugal have no direct effect on Community countries, but it is too early
to obtain the judgment.
6. Relationship between Articles 85 and 30
In its decision on Maize Seed,18' currently on appeal to the Commu-
nity Court, the Commission condemned a series of agreements as restrict-
ing competition within the Common Market and affecting trade between
member States contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.""' INRA had
developed new varieties of maize seed and held the plant breeder's rights
in France.lss In 1960, it permitted Eisle to obtain the rights in Germany,
and some years later, it granted him exclusive rights to propagate and sell
the seed only in Germany. 84 INRA agreed that neither it nor its licen-
sees, who grew the varieties in France, would produce the seeds in Ger-
many or sell them there, and that it would prevent those deriving title to
the seed from so doing.'88 Eisle agreed not to produce or sell other vari-
eties of maize, to sell the seed only to particular dealers, and to buy two
thirds of his requirements for Germany from France."8 The Commission
also objected to the settlement of an action in a German court which
Eisle brought against David, a trader who bought seed in France and ex-
ported it to Germany, restraining David from continuing the practice.'
It is being argued that the agreement that enabled Eisle to register
the plant breeder's rights cannot infringe on Article 85; it is merely the
transfer of a right.188 Otherwise, the sale of a patent or even of a subsidi-
ary holding intellectual property rights would be subject to the competi-
tion rules. Of course, the transfer of rights may amount to part of the
mechanism of a cartel, in which case it would be caught, but the assign-
ment by itself would not suffice. It is odd that Eisle was able to restrain
180 Id. at 417.
181 Re the Agreement between Kurt Eisle and the Institut National de Recherche Agro-
nomique [hereinafter cited as Maize Seed] (78/823) 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 23
(1978), [1978], 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 434.
182 Id. at 36, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 436.
183 Id.
18 Id. at 27, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 437, 444.
185 Id. at 28, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 444.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 29, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 444-45.
18 Id. at 30, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 447. This view was confirmed by the Advo-
cate General, Madame Rozes. Feb. 2, 1982 Transcript of the Maize Seed decision at 72,
verified by author.
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David from selling seed in Germany which was bought from the French
growers. Article 30 should have prevented him from doing so.1 '1 The
Commission has alleged that the agreements resulted in the maintenance
of prices at far higher levels than in France, although there is a dispute as
to the appropriate prices to be used for comparison. 189
If the Commission has rightly condemned the restrictions on the
French growers exporting to Germany themselves or allowing others to do
so as infringing Article 85(1) and not meriting exemption in the present
case, the rules for the free movement of goods enable purchasers from the
growers to export to Germany, thereby limiting the price differences that
can be maintained even if Eisle owns the plant breeder's rights in that
country. Are the cases on free movement still based on the concept of
exhaustion? If so, Eisle would be entitled to exercise his German right to
restrain the French growers from their selling directly in Germany. He
would be protected to the extent that a parallel importer needs a margin
within which to operate. I shall consider at the end of this article, how-
ever, the possibility that the Court may now have abandoned the doctrine
of exhaustion-there were no rights to exhaust in Merck-in which case
it may not be possible to restrain sales made by French growers directly
to Germany.
The Maize Seed judgment has been eagerly anticipated for several
years, but the proceedings have been unusually slow. The hearing was in
October, 1981 and judgment is expected early in 1982. The Court may
"'LI The Advocate General gave some additional facts that explain the matter. The
seeds sold by David were 21/2 years old, they may have been of sizes inappropriate to the
seives used in Germany for sowing seed, and they may have been disinfected by chemicals
not permitted by German law. Thus Nungasser was legitimately concerned that sale in Ger-
many might damage the company's reputation. Feb. 2, 1982 Transcript of the Maize Seed
decision at 94, verified by author. In any event, Madame Rozes considered that the settle-
ment of litigation in Court was a judicial act and not an agreement beween undertakings
subject to Article 85. Id. at 53 verified by author.
189 Id. at 29, [1978] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 446-47. Madame Rozes concluded that
prices in France in 1972 had been substantially higher on the average than those charged by
10 co-operatives on which the Commission's finding was based.
In the long opinion, Madame Rozes advised the Court to quash the Commission's deci-
sion in respect to all the matters that were subject to appeal. She objected to the Commis-
sion confusing the free movement of goods with competition. Id. at 63 veritifed by author.
Some people may well criticize the opinion for a few elementary errors, for example
Consten, supra note 22, and Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 51 related to patents. It is
hoped that this will not lead the Court to ignore its merits, which seem far more important.
Contrary to many Commission decisions, Madame Rozes states that certain activities will
not take place unless a licensee can be protected. In other words, an exclusive production
license may not give enough protection without an exclusive sales license as well. She has
even been prepared to admit that absolute territorial protection from competition in the
same item may be necessary, and not anti-competitive, when there is competition from
other similar items. These are most welcome innovations in official Community thinking.
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establish how far an assignment, and an exclusive license of plant
breeder's rights (and presumably also of patents and copyright) are capa-
ble of infringing on Article 85. In Grundig, the Court has already held
that the exercise of rights obtained by an agreement to confer absolute
territorial protection on a dealer can be restrained, otherwise it would be
futile to condemn the agreement under which the rights were obtained.90
The Court may also say how far a limited license to sell only in Germany
can be treated as an agreement not to export, which may infringe on Arti-
cle 85(1); whether a limited license to sell in one member State, unless
exempted under Article 85(3), amounts to a license to sell throughout the
Common Market. It is argued by many that there would be more licens-
ing and more exploitation of innovation if limited licenses were possible.
Some holders of rights may be too small to exploit them throughout the
Common Market, but may not wish to expose the territories reserved for
themselves or another licensee to competition. The Division of the Com-
mission that deals with industrial property rights is, however, more dis-
posed to exempting export restrictions than is the Directorate that deals
with other kinds of cases, even though it will not countenance export re-
strictions on buyers from the limited licensee.1 '
G. Cable Television
Coditel v. Cin6 Vog Films'92 involved the provisions for the free
movement of services, not goods, and will be considered shortly. Coditel,
a Belgian cable television company, picked up a German television trans-
mission of a film and relayed it to its subscribers in Belgium.'93 In a test
case, the exclusive Belgian licensee of the right to a film relayed by
Coditel claimed that to do so without a license amounted to a copyright
infringement - a claim upheld by the Cour d'Appel of Brussels under
national law,"" although certain questions of Community law were re-
ferred to the Community Court.19 5
Both the Court and Advocate General Warner recognized that Article
59196 applies to broadcasting and television services. 197 The services of-
09o See Consten and Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] Common Mkt. L.R. 418.
191 Proposal for a Commission Regulation on the Application of Art. 85(3) of the Treaty
for certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 22 O.J. EUR. COMm. (No. C 58) 12
(1979).
19 Coditel v. Cine Vog Films, (62/79) [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R.
362 [hereinafter cited as Coditel].
193 Id. at 884, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 369.
194 Id.
Id.
194 Article 59. Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on
freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during
the transitional period in respect of nationals of member-states who are established in a
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fered by Coditel to its subscribers would not come within its provisions,
since both were in Belgium. Advocate General Warner, however, made it
clear that the services of the German broadcasting station were intended
for Belgian viewers since prices in Belgian francs were included in the
station's advertisements." 8 Article 59 was so applicable.19 The Court did
not specify the service to which Article 59 applied; whether by Coditel to
German advertisers to extend the audience, or by the German station to
subscribers to Coditel. 200 The rules for the free movement of services in-
clude no express provision similar to Article 36, but Mr. Warner believed
that this was due to inadvertance, and was prepared to infer such limita-
tions. Again, the Court's decision was cryptic but it used language very
similar to the second sentence of Article 36. Both Advocate General
Warner and the Court refused to extend the doctrine of exhaustion to
broadcast and television transmissions. The Court said:
11. The second question raises the problem of whether Articles 59 and 60
of the Treaty prohibit an assignment, limited to the territory of a mem-
ber-State, of the copyright in a film, in view of the fact that a series of
such assignments might result in the partitioning of the Common Market
as regards the undertaking of economic activity in the film industry.
12. A cinematographic film belongs to the category of literary and artistic
works made available to the public by performances which may be infi-
nitely repeated. In this respect the problems involved in the observance
of copyright in relation to the requirements of the Treaty are not the
same as those which arise in connection with literary and artistic works
the placing of which at the disposal of the public is inseparable from the
circulation of the material form of the works, as in the case of books or
records.
13. In these circumstances the owner of the copyright in a film and his
assigns have a legitimate interest in calculating the fees due in respect of
the authorization to exhibit the film on the basis of the actual or proba-
ble number of performances and in authorizing a television broadcast of
the film only after it has been exhibited in cinemas for a certain period
of time. It appears from the file on the present case that the contract
made between the producer of the film and Cin6 Vog stipulated that the
exclusive right which was assigned included the right to exhibit the film
Le Boucher publicly in Belgium by way of projection in cinemas and on
television but that the right to have the film diffused by Belgian televi-
sion could not be exercised until 40 months after the first showing of the
film in Belgium.
State of Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended, re-
printed in Coditel at [1980] E.C.R. 871.
'9 Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. 875, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 386.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 903, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 399.
200 See generally, Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. 903, [1981] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 399.
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14. These facts are important in two regards. On the one hand, they
highlight the fact that the right of a copyright owner and his assigns to
require fees from any showing of a film is part of the essential function of
copyright in this type of literary and artistic work. On the other hand,
they demonstrate that the exploitation of copyright in films and the fees
attaching thereto cannot be regulated without regard being had to the
possibility of television broadcasts of those films. The question whether
an assignment of copyright limited to the territory of a member-State is
capable of constituting a restriction on freedom to provide services must
be examined in this context.
2 0
'
The Court went on to declare that restrictions on the right to provide
services might be imposed by national law to protect intellectual prop-
erty, unless this constitutes "a means of arbitrary discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on trade between member-States"-language that re-
flects Article 36:202
16... whilst copyright entails the right to demand fees for any showing
or performance, the rules of the Treaty cannot in principle constitute an
obstacle to the geographic limits which the parties to a contract of as-
signment have agreed upon in order to protect the author and his assigns
in this regard.2°2
The Court's ruling was, therefore, quite different from those previously
made regarding physical articles protected by patents or other forms of
copyright.2°' The judgments in Musik-Vertrieb, Membran and Merck,
however, show that the Coditel judgment is not being extended to patents
or mechanical rights. Performing rights have been treated as sui generis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's judgments have met with more criticism than might oth-
201 Coditel, [1980] E.C.R. 902-903, [1981] Common Mkt. L.R. at 399-400.
20 Id. art. 903, [1981] Common Mkt. L.R. at 400.
203 Id.
204 It was also quite different from its decisions on trademarks. In Van Zuylen Freres v.
Hag (192/73) [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 127 the Court held that where
marks had a common origin, even if that link had been severed by a governmental decree
sequestering the property of an enemy alien, the holder of the mark in one member state
could not enforce the mark to prevent the goods to which the mark had been lawfully fixed
by the original owner in Germany, whether they had been marketed there, or not. The trade
mark case went beyond the doctrine of exhaustion laid down a month or so after the Hag
ruling in Centrafarm v. Sterling. In relation to performing, as opposed to mechanical rights,
the court has allowed the market to be divided by exclusive licenses granted for different
areas, even if they are divided along national boundaries. Such limited exclusive licenses
might, however, be subject to control under Article 85, as an agreement restricting competi-
tion. The Brussels Cour d'Appel has decided to refer these questions in relation to Article
85 to the Community Court. Case No. 262/81.
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erwise have been expected because of their form. The Court tends merely
to repeat assertions made in earlier cases, even when these have been
criticised. The apparent logic of its judgments often depends on a selec-
tive statement of those aspects of national law which lead to the result it
has chosen. Its Advocate Generals prepare opinions that are more cogent
and often consider what policy should be adopted. The Court, however,
gives but a single judgment, which makes for obscure passages that may
conceal disagreement. Some of the judges have had little experience with
commercial law and practice, a number having been more concerned with
public and administrative law. Yet most of the cases have been decided
by seven or nine judges who must agree on the text of their ruling and the
reasons for giving it.
The policy and law that support the grant of an exclusive right to the
patentee are complex. Seen ex post, after the investment in innovation
has been made, such a right appears strongly anticompetitive, and the
territorial limitation of national laws appears to insulate national mar-
kets. Seen ex ante, before the investment has been committed to innova-
tion, the anticipated exclusive right may increase competition by encour-
aging investments which pay the community as a whole, but which would
otherwise not pay the person financing the innovation. The exclusive
right may encourage the development of a new product. Where national
laws relate to compulsory patents, lack of patent protection or price con-
trol differ, and allowing the import into the high priced member States of
goods first marketed in those countries giving less protection will discour-
age some innovation that would otherwise occur and may also reduce the
amount of marketing done in those member States which give less protec-
tion to the holder of the right.
On the other hand, the policy favoring the integration of the market
leads to clear and simple rules. Perhaps we should not be surprised that
the free movement of goods has been preferred to the encouragement of
investment in innovation when the objectives appear to conflict.
In the early cases it seemed as if the Court was adopting a rule that
once the patentee had obtained some reward through a patent license or
on first sale within the Community, his rights were exhausted, although
this is not quite what it said in Centrafarm v. Sterling. It expressly stated
only that the rule in the member States whereby exhaustion did not ap-
ply to sales in other member States which was an obstacle to free move-
ment that must be justified under Article 36. In Membran it may have
rejected the basis of exhaustion for its rule since, as Advocate General
Warner had pointed out, there can be no exhaustion where there is no
exclusive right to exhaust. In its absence, there is no opportunity to earn
a monopoly reward free from competition by those taking a free ride on
the investment of the person holding the right. In that case, however, the
copyright holder was entitled to a royalty, even if he could not prevent
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the production and sale of records that would have infringed his copy-
right but for the statutory license. In Merck, of course, the patentee could
have obtained no monopoly profits in Italy since he enjoyed no rights at
all.
It is particularly difficult for the Community Court to develop the
law when giving abstract rulings to questions of interpretation of the
Treaty submitted by national courts. The submissions made to it on be-
half of Merck were cogent and thorough, but the Court did not deal with
them. Apart from reciting some of the arguments, the reasons which the
Court gave for its ruling were in six paragraphs. It merely asserted that a
patent does not guarantee a reward, and that the patentee can choose
whether or not to sell in a country where he enjoys no protection, and
must accept the consequences of his choice as it will be legal for his pur-
chasers to sell in other member States where he does enjoy protection. No
policy reasons are given for discouraging the patentee from selling in a
country where he does not enjoy protection and the Court does not at-
tempt to say why it is extending its earlier judgment in Centrafarm v.
Sterling. The writer fears that until the Court is able to publish dissent-
ing and individual opinions, important policy issues will be ignored by the
Court's judgments. Their apparent logic also makes critical appraisal
difficult.
The European developments must seem strange to Americans. The
Supreme Court held in Adams v. Burke'05 that under U.S. patent law, the
country could not be divided into segments. The exclusive licensee for an
area that excluded Boston could not prevent coffin lids, protected by the
patent and legitimately made and sold by another licensee in Boston from
being resold outside that isolated area.2 0 6 The member States of the Com-
munity, however, have laws far less similar than the commercial ones of
the United States. The European problem arises not only from the terri-
torial limitation to the intellectual property rights under national law, but
also from diverse laws of other kinds, including the differing ways in
which governments try to reduce prices. This is especially apparent with
pharmaceutical products, the demand for which is irresponsive to price
levels, since the doctor's prescription and most of the bill is usually paid
by an insurance fund, private or state.
The best solution would doubtless be to harmonize the national laws.
By ignoring the distortions they create, the Court may be increasing the
pressure that industry will bring to bear on national governments to re-
duce the distortions. However, it is hard on some firms and may result in
less being spent on innovation in the interim. Except in Coditel, the
Court has established a rule against discrimination along national bound-
2o5 84 U.S. 453 (1973).
208 Id. at 456-57.
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aries. The Common Market cannot be divided by national industrial
property rights, nor by export bans and deterrents, if investment activity
is to be encouraged.

